




## PAPER DERIVED FROM THESIS

## The Truth and Scope of *al-‘Ilm al-Ḥuḍūrī* (Knowledge by Presence) in the Thought of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī and Some Prominent Western Philosophers

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ARTICLE INFO	ABSTRACT	
<p><b>Article History:</b> Received: 20 December 2023 Revised: 10 February 2024 Accepted: 15 March 2024</p>	<p><b>SUBJECT &amp; OBJECTIVES:</b> The truth and significance of knowledge are indisputable, as they represent one of the most critical metaphysical questions. This is why numerous philosophers globally have engaged in discussions on the topic. A prominent contemporary philosopher, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī, has extensively examined knowledge, its classifications, truth, scope, and the associated issues. This paper concentrates on one specific category of knowledge, namely <i>al-‘Ilm al-Ḥuḍūrī</i> (knowledge by presence), as articulated by ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī and various Western philosophers.</p>	
<p><b>Key Words:</b>  <i>Knowledge by Presence</i>  <i>‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī</i>  <i>Philosophy</i>  <i>Scope of Knowledge</i>  <i>European Thinkers</i></p>	<p><b>METHOD &amp; FINDING:</b> This article presents a comparative analysis of the concept of knowledge by presence, focusing on the perspectives of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī and various European philosophers. The research methodology employed in this study is a descriptive-analytical approach.</p>	
<p><b>DOI:</b> <a href="https://doi.org/10.22034/imjpl.2024.9966">10.22034/imjpl.2024.9966</a></p>	<p><b>CONCLUSION:</b> The issue of knowledge by presence and its significance for ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī and René Descartes is a definite and obvious matter. Baruch Spinoza is a philosopher who adeptly employed mathematical and geometric methods to articulate philosophical concepts with remarkable clarity and precision. The eminent German philosopher Immanuel Kant regarded the issue of knowledge as the central theme of his philosophical inquiry. From Heidegger's perspective, the inquiry into the provability of an external world is devoid of meaning.</p>	
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## Introduction

Epistemology focuses on how human knowledge aligns with the external world and why that matters. Throughout history, philosophers have explored these ideas. European and Islamic thinkers have offered various views on humanity, the soul, and the nature of truth.

‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī, a contemporary Islamic philosopher, explored new philosophical ideas and, using insights from illumination philosophy, the peripatetic school of philosophy, and transcendental philosophy, proposed a new interpretation of their compatibility. He argues that all acquired sciences return to *al-‘Ilm al-Ḥuḍūrī* (knowledge by presence) (*Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 2002, p. 237*).

## Theoretical Foundations

In essence, knowledge can be classified into two distinct categories.

- *Al-‘Ilm al-Ḥuḍūrī* (Knowledge by Presence)
- *Al-‘Ilm al-Ḥuṣūlī* (Knowledge by Acquisition)

Knowledge by presence contrasts sharply with knowledge by acquisition. The former refers to an intuitive and immediate understanding that is grasped directly, devoid of any mediation, arbitration, or interference from external human senses. In simple terms, the knower understands the known directly, without needing a mental image. This direct connection is evident in how we experience emotions like anger, hatred, love, and desire.

In the work, *The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism*, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī articulates that knowledge by presence refers to a form of understanding in which the object of knowledge, along with its external reality, is directly accessible to the knower. This form of knowledge does not rely on mere representations or images; instead, it allows the knower to grasp the essence of the known. Entities that exist independently of us cannot be identical to us nor can they be intrinsic to our nature. The essence of all that we encounter, whether it aligns with our own being or pertains to the various dimensions of our existence, necessitates a critical examination and evaluation of our understanding (*Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1993, p. 60*).

This definition of knowledge by presence encompasses the following two significant aspects:

- Present knowledge of humans on their own existence.
- Present knowledge of humans on the levels and attachments of their existence.

By analyzing these two points, four types of knowledge by presence can be proposed for humans:

- Human’s Knowledge of His Own Existence (I/ Me/Myself)

According to *Idrākāt al-‘Itibāriyah* (conventional perceptions), theorized by ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī, true knowledge is the mental unveiling of reality and the fact, and since there is a sacred purpose behind the great creation and

the heavens and the earth were not created in vain, he introduces the ultimate goal of creation to reach the state of servitude, which is God's closeness. Therefore, while searching for the truth, the Quran warns man to step on the path of self-knowledge. 'Allāma believes that self-knowledge has an impressive role in the education and morals of souls (*Amini et al., 2023*).

- Human Knowledge By Presence of His Soul's Actions (Psychological States, Feelings, and Emotions)
- Human Knowledge By Presence Regarding The Powers and Tools of His Soul (Perceptive Powers and Stimulating Forces)
- Human's Knowledge By Presence About His Mental Images and Concepts.

### Literature Review

For the first time in history, Neo-Platonists, particularly Plotinus, introduced the concept of 'knowledge by presence,' alongside other key ideas such as 'illumination,' which were subsequently elaborated upon by Proclus. The phrase 'knowledge by presence' is missing from the works of many philosophers, including those from the Milesian School, Pythagoreans, Eleatics, Atomists, Sophists, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Hellenistic thinkers.

In the New Era, John Locke explores a type of inner knowledge similar to knowledge by presence. The 18<sup>th</sup> century, known as the Enlightenment, emphasized rationalism and scientific inquiry.

Influential philosophers like Hume and Kant did not explore the idea of knowledge by presence during this period. Critiques of revealed theology and support for rational theology intensified discussions in the context of liberal theologians like Schleiermacher. Their emphasis on religious experience and mystical revelations attracted Western intellectuals to the idea of knowledge by presence.

In Islamic philosophy, Avicenna was the pioneer in addressing the concepts of knowledge by presence and knowledge by acquisition, particularly concerning an object's self-awareness (*Avicenna, 1981, pp. 117-119*).

Such discussions are notably absent in the writings of Al-Kindy and Al-Farabi. Furthermore, Shihāb ad-Dīn Yahya ibn Habash Suhrawardī, known as *Shaikh al-Ishraq* (Master of Illumination) provided an extensive examination of the nature of knowledge by presence, introducing additional levels of understanding related to this concept (*Motahari, 1998, p. 307*).

He stands out as the first Muslim philosopher to significantly contribute to the development and elaboration of knowledge by presence.

The Muslim mystics, particularly Ibn 'Arabi, dedicated an entire chapter to the concept of intuition and its various levels, employing the notion of knowledge by presence (*Qaysari, 1996, pp. 85-94*).

Ṣadr al-Muti'allihīn al-Shīrāzī

recognized as the founder of *al-Ḥikma al-Muta'aliya* (transcendental philosophy), engaged extensively in discussions regarding the concept of knowledge by presence, distinguishing himself from other philosophers and theologians. Throughout his various writings and philosophical inquiries, he frequently invoked the notion of knowledge by presence, particularly emphasizing topics such as Divine Knowledge and self-knowledge as key illustrations of this concept (*Shīrāzī, 1989, p. 180; 2001, p. 181; 1998, p. 185-186*).

Scholars, including the students of Mullā Ṣadrā, have also explored the implications of ontological, epistemological, and anthropological dimensions of knowledge by presence (*Kashani, 1996, pp. 18-20*).

In the contemporary landscape of New Transcendental Philosophy, philosophers have addressed the emerging challenges within epistemology and philosophy by employing the concept of *al-ʿIlm al-Ḥuḍūrī* and elucidating its various functions. A key figure in this intellectual movement is ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī, who significantly contributed to the resurgence of new philosophical thought and the advancement of knowledge by presence (*Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 2001: 175-188; 2002: 232-240; 1998: 271-275*).

His disciples have made substantial contributions to the expansion of Ṭabāṭabāʾī's ideas across philosophical, theological, and Quranic discussions

(*Sobḥāni, 1996, pp. 107-110; Hassanzadeh Amoli, 1992, p. 50; Miṣbāh Yazdi, 2018, p. 175*).

### **The Return of Acquired Knowledge To Knowledge By Presence**

In the book *Nihāyat al-Ḥikmah*, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī explains the role of direct knowledge by discussing how conceptual knowledge can return to it. At the beginning of the eleventh section of the mentioned book, emphasizes that knowledge is something we feel directly and proves that the knowledge of the self is direct.

He then divides knowledge into two types, namely *al-ʿIlm al-Ḥuḍūrī* (Knowledge by Presence) and *al-ʿIlm al-Ḥuṣūlī* (Knowledge by Acquisition). In this respect, he wrote, “This is what the primitive perspective leads to regarding the division of knowledge into acquired and present, and what deep contemplation guides us to is that the acquired knowledge also ultimately leads to present knowledge” (*Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 2002, p. 237*).

In other words, humans initially divide knowledge into acquired and present, but with deeper contemplation, we realize that acquired knowledge ultimately leads to present knowledge.

### **1. Ṭabāṭabāʾī and Descartes**

#### **1.1. Knowledge By Presence and Intuitive Knowledge**

The issue of knowledge by presence and its significance for ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī and René Descartes (1596-1650) is a

definite and obvious matter. ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī has paid attention to human knowledge by presence in several discussions and chapters of his philosophical reflections and has proposed some theories in this regard. A part of the late Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s reflections can be rephrased as follows:

- He has divided knowledge into two categories:
  - a. Knowledge by presence
  - b. Knowledge by acquisition (*Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1993, p. 150*).
- The late Ṭabāṭabā’ī enumerates various types of knowledge by presence. For example, self-knowledge of every single essence of itself, knowledge of the actions of an abstract essence, the knowledge of the soul about its powers and tools through which it performs its actions, knowledge by presence about emotions and feelings, knowledge of cause about its effect, knowledge of effect about its cause and the knowledge of two effects about each other that have a common cause (*Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1993, p. 239*).
- According to the late Allama, knowledge by presence is infallible knowledge (*Ṭabāṭabā’ī: 1993, p. 234*).
- In the opinion of Ṭabāṭabā’ī, the basic source of knowledge by acquisition is knowledge by presence. In other words, knowledge by acquisition returns to knowledge by presence. He presents two theories regarding

the process of knowledge by acquisition and the mechanisms through which it occurs.

**First Theory:** The initial theory posits that sensations first interact with the body, and the soul is intrinsically linked to the body. It becomes connected with these sensations, gaining knowledge through their presence. Subsequently, the imaginative power converts this awareness of sensations into a learned and visual form of knowledge, which is then stored in memory. Following this phase, which involves the development of sensory and imaginative representations in the mind through processes such as comparison and abstraction, the mind also generates general and intellectual concepts (*Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1993, p. 236*).

**Second Theory:** It posits that the interaction of the body with sensations and objects serves as the essential groundwork for the soul, enabling a limited engagement with the realms of ideas and rational thought. Subsequently, the soul converts this immediate discovery, driven by urgency and necessity for both theoretical and practical endeavors into knowledge through acquisition, ultimately shaping it into sensory, imaginative, and intellectual awareness (*Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1993, pp. 239, 249, 313, 314*).

- The root and origin of the abstraction of some of the most fundamental



philosophical concepts such as 'Essence' and 'Cause and Effect' are some examples of knowledge by presence of a human being concerning his soul and its effects.

In this regard, the late Ṭabāṭabā'ī said, "The connection between powers and actions, along with their association with the soul, is understood through both knowledge by presence and knowledge by acquisition" (*Ṭabāṭabā'ī, 2018, p. 67*).

Based on the aforementioned points, it is evident that both knowledge by presence and intuitive knowledge hold significant and crucial importance in the epistemological and ontological framework of 'Allāma Ṭabāṭabā'ī.

Descartes has placed significant emphasis on the concept of knowledge by presence, as well as on intuitive knowledge. He considers knowledge by presence to be the foundational element of his philosophical framework. To circumvent doubt and solidify his philosophical ideas, he requires a robust and unassailable basis, which he finds in knowledge by presence. In this context, Descartes articulates, "I will now close my eyes, I will stop my ears, I will turn away my senses from their objects, I will even efface from my consciousness all the images of corporeal things; or at least, because this can hardly be accomplished, I will consider them as empty and false; and thus, holding converse only with

myself, and closely examining my nature, I will endeavor to obtain by degrees a more intimate and familiar knowledge of myself. I am a thinking (conscious) thing, that is, a being who doubts, affirms, denies, knows a few objects, and is ignorant of many—who loves, hates, wills, refuses, who imagines likewise, and perceives; for, as I before remarked, although the things which I perceive or imagine are perhaps nothing at all apart from me and in themselves, I am nevertheless assured that those modes of consciousness which I call perceptions and imaginations, in as far only as they are modes of consciousness, exist in me. And in the little I have said I think I have summed up all that I really know, or at least all that up to this time I was aware I knew" (*Descartes, 1982, pp. 61-62*).

Also, in Descartes' view, 'intuition' as a foundation and basis for philosophical and true thinking is a rational insight that, just like sensory perception, is directly perceived and causes inner certainty. This intuition is unquestionable and certain (*Sanaei, 1997, p. 28*).

## **1.2. Truth and Error in Judgment**

'Allāma Ṭabāṭabā'ī addresses the concepts of truth and error in judgment as they pertain to a specific level of perception. He has delineated four distinct stages of perception, asserting that the matters of truth and error are associated with the fourth stage. According to the

esteemed Ṭabāṭabā’ī, the stages of perception are categorized as follows:

- The stage of the normal operation of the sensory organs and the influence of the sensory organs
- Performing the sensory perception and understanding the physical and geometric properties of an object
- Judgment in sensory perception and its conformity with the outside
- The stage of compliance with the ratio and judgment and comparison with the outside (Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1998, p. 54).

Descartes has also addressed the issue of truth and error in one of his meditations in his book *Reflections on First Philosophy*. In this regard, he wrote, “Regarding the concepts themselves, if we examine them in isolation without referencing any external factors, they should not be deemed errors. This is because the validity of either imagination, whether it be of a goat or a giant, holds equal weight in truth. It is important to recognize that the potential for errors in actions or desires should not be a source of fear. I may wish for things that are either undesirable or entirely non-existent. Nevertheless, the reality remains that I do have these desires. Therefore, the primary concern lies in the acknowledgments I must make, which require careful consideration to avoid any missteps. A prevalent and significant mistake that can arise in the context of affirmations is the assumption

that my mental constructs are analogous to or aligned with external entities. If I regard these constructs merely as manifestations or dimensions of my cognition, without ascribing them to any external reality, it becomes exceedingly unlikely that they would serve as a foundation for my misconceptions” (Descartes, 1982, pp. 65-66, 74).

Descartes believes that truth and error lie only in affirmations, especially when we make judgments about the outside world.

Descartes posits that error arises from the notion that individuals believe in the existence of certain entities in the external world while simultaneously assuming that their mental representations of these entities perfectly align with reality.

## 2. Ṭabāṭabā’ī and Spinoza

A notable similarity between the late Ṭabāṭabā’ī and Spinoza lies in their dedicated focus on the mathematical method within their philosophical texts. In works such as *The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism*, as well as *The Beginning of Wisdom and The End of Wisdom*, the late Ṭabāṭabā’ī systematically defines concepts, articulates principles, and elucidates the logical connections among various topics.

He has addressed this matter in one of his publications. He states, “The late Bādkūbei, concerned with the education of the writer, instructed me to study

mathematics to enhance my capacity for argumentative reasoning and to refine my philosophical sensibilities. In compliance with his highness's directive, I enrolled in the class of the late Agha Seyyed Abu al-Qasim Khānsāri, a distinguished mathematician, where I undertook a curriculum that included argumentative calculus, as well as courses in both plane and spatial geometry, and argumentative algebra” (*Ṭabāṭabā'ī*, 2008, p. 9).

Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) was a philosopher who adeptly employed mathematical and geometric methods to articulate philosophical concepts with remarkable clarity and precision. He utilized this method in the composition of the first and second parts of Descartes' *Principles of Philosophy*, while also applying it in his seminal work, ethics, which is structured around definitions, principles, theorems, and proofs (*Spinoza*, 2005).

### 3. Ṭabāṭabā'ī and Immanuel Kant

The eminent German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) regarded knowledge as the central theme of his philosophical inquiry. He posited that philosophy's primary and fundamental objective is to engage with epistemology.

The advent of Kant marked a significant transformation in Western philosophical thought, steering it

towards the domain of epistemology. From Kant's time to the present, the question of knowledge has been regarded as the central and most critical concern within philosophy. Kant posited that epistemology holds precedence over other philosophical inquiries.

‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā'ī is recognized as a pioneer in the field of epistemology, introducing innovative approaches and contexts. He articulated and systematized epistemological knowledge by presenting various epistemological perspectives and engaging in comparative discussions, thereby revitalizing the discipline. According to him, a comprehensive understanding of the mind and knowledge is essential for the development of any philosophical framework. He asserted that epistemological inquiries must precede other philosophical considerations. The essence of his philosophical endeavors lies in the assertion that before engaging in metaphysical contemplation, one must first navigate the domain of knowledge and refine their positions and viewpoints.

Kant posits that the human mind is not merely a passive recipient of perceptions and factual knowledge; rather, the perceptual apparatus itself plays an active and independent role in the processes of awareness and understanding. This engagement of the human perceptive system is uniquely characteristic of humans, manifesting in the dual capacities of feeling and understanding. The senses, informed by the constructs of



time and space, and the understanding, guided by its twelve distinct categories, collaborate in this cognitive activity (*Ref: Mojtahedi, 1981*).

Ṭabāṭabā’ī posited that the perceptive system encompasses both an active and a passive dimension. He argued that the concept of multiplicity is intrinsically linked to perceptions and is independent of the actual objects, which are merely the outcomes of various factors interacting with the mind. These interactions generate perceptions through a specific engagement with perceptive faculties, thereby compelling the emergence of numerous perceptions. In essence, this multiplicity does not stem from the passive dimension of the mind; rather, it is associated with the active dimension, with the primary driver being the mind's own capacity for multiplication (*Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1993, p. 10*).

#### **4. Ṭabāṭabā’ī and Martin Heidegger**

In the preface of his philosophical works i.e., *Nihāyat-al Hikmah* and *Bidāyat-al Hikmah*, Ṭabāṭabā’ī asserts that the fundamental reality, as well as the reality that transcends human existence, does not require argumentative validation. He posits a profound interrelation between humanity and the reality that exists beyond it. In the introduction of the book *Nihāyat-al Hikmah*, he articulates that it is indisputable that humans are entities that genuinely exist, and there are also external entities that coexist with us,

influencing and being influenced by our actions. He notes the presence of various elements in our external environment, such as the air we breathe, the food we consume, the structures we inhabit, the land we traverse, as well as animals, plants, and other entities.

Beyond our individual experiences, there exist various phenomena that we observe visually, alongside others that we detect audibly. Additionally, there are sensations that we experience through our sense of touch, as well as those that we identify through our olfactory and gustatory senses, among other perceptual modalities.

In the external world, individuals encounter various entities that they either pursue or shun, experience affection for or aversion to, and harbor aspirations or apprehensions regarding. There exist elements that resonate with our intrinsic inclinations or provoke our distaste, as well as tools that we employ to fulfill our diverse objectives and ambitions, which may include arriving at a destination, departing from one, or attaining a specific location. Our desires are often driven by the pursuit of pleasure, the avoidance of pain, or the resolution of undesirable situations.

The phenomena we observe are not devoid of substance. They possess genuine existence and are substantiated by evidence. Individuals seek out objects or concepts only because they

represent an external truth or a tangible entity. Even if something does not exist in a concrete form, it still points towards a verifiable reality. Consequently, it is impossible to entirely question the nature of existence and reality without contradicting the fundamental truths or expressing skepticism towards them. Any assertion of denial or doubt regarding reality is ultimately articulated through language (*Shirvani, 2008, pp. 27-29*).

In *Bidāyat-al Hikmah*, it is articulated that through introspection, individuals recognize their own grasp of truth and reality, as well as the existence of truths beyond their personal experience. This awareness enables them to perceive and engage with these external realities. For instance, when an individual seeks knowledge or understanding, they regard it as an objective reality. Similarly, the instinct to flee from danger is predicated on the acknowledgment of an external threat; a child desiring their mother's milk is, in essence, yearning for a tangible entity known as milk, rather than a mere figment of imagination. Likewise, a person escaping from a predator is responding to a real entity in the external world, rather than an illusion or a mythical being (*Ibid: 910*).

From Heidegger's perspective, the inquiry into the provability of an external world is devoid of meaning. Existential analysis reveals that the only

reality is that of 'being in the world.' Consequently, Heidegger deems the question of whether the world exists externally or can be substantiated as fundamentally misguided. He asserts, "The belief in the reality of the external world, whether deemed true or false and the endeavor to validate this reality whether adequate or inadequate, overtly or covertly—along with any such attempts lacking sufficient clarity, presupposes a knowing agent (transcendental self) that is either nearly devoid of a world or uncertain about its own existence, ultimately necessitating reassurance regarding the existence of that world" (*Heidegger, 2008*).

Human beings are inherently connected to the world, and the notion of a human devoid of worldly context is a misguided interpretation. This philosopher posits that human existence is intrinsically linked to the world, with the phrase 'being in the world' serving as a descriptor of human presence. The essence of having a world encompasses a comprehensive understanding of presence, which entails both self-awareness and the awareness of other beings. To illustrate this concept, Heidegger employs the example of tactile perception to elucidate the interrelation between humans and other entities.

The phrase 'we are in contact with a wall' indicates our conscious awareness of the interaction with the wall. Conversely, when we state 'the

chair is in contact with the wall,' it implies that the chair lacks any awareness of this interaction. In the former instance, our contact is characterized by sensory perception, whereas in the latter, the relationship between the chair and the wall is purely a physical phenomenon.

Heidegger posits that the underlying rationale for this distinction lies in the fact that, in the initial scenario, human beings possess an awareness of their own existence, whereas the chair lacks any such self-awareness. To put it differently, the existence of the individual necessitates the presence of a boundary for their experience (*Khatami, 2000, pp. 44-57*).

Heidegger posits that Dasein does not conceive of itself as a mere subjectivity or an isolated 'I,' devoid of any connection to objects. This perspective underpins the essence of human existence as fundamentally intertwined with the world. The formation and essence of Dasein are rooted in its situatedness within the world. The world cannot be regarded as an external entity; rather, our existence is inherently reliant upon it. Dasein's being is inextricably linked to the external reality that constitutes the world.

This philosopher posits that the initial inquiry regarding the phenomenon of existence pertains to the location from which we can attain absolute certainty about it. The response indicates that this

phenomenon is essentially a broad perspective encompassing the myriad small beings that inhabit our surroundings (*Corvez, 1990*).

### **Conclusion**

The phrase 'knowledge by presence' does not appear in the works of numerous philosophers, including those associated with the Milesian School, the Pythagoreans, the Eleatics, the Atomists, the Sophists, as well as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and thinkers from the Hellenistic period. Within Islamic philosophy, Avicenna emerged as the first to explore the distinctions between knowledge by presence and knowledge by acquisition, particularly in relation to an object's self-awareness.

Ṣadr al-Mutī'allihīn al-Shīrāzī, who is acknowledged as the founder of transcendental philosophy, engaged in extensive discourse on knowledge by presence, setting himself apart from his philosophical and theological contemporaries. In the modern context of New Transcendental Philosophy, scholars have tackled emerging epistemological challenges by utilizing the concept of knowledge by presence and clarifying its various roles. A prominent figure in this movement is 'Allāma Ṭabāṭabā'ī, who played a crucial role in revitalizing philosophical thought and advancing the understanding of knowledge by presence. The relevance of knowledge by presence is a clear and significant

concern for both ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī and René Descartes. Baruch Spinoza is notable for his effective use of mathematical and geometric methods to express philosophical ideas with exceptional clarity and precision. The distinguished German philosopher Immanuel Kant considered the question of knowledge to be the focal point of his philosophical exploration. From Heidegger's viewpoint, the investigation into the provability of an external world lacks significance.

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The corresponding author, has the main role in all stages, from study conception and design, data collection, analysis, and interpretation of results to manuscript preparation. The second author, as a supervisor, has reviewed the manuscript critically and helped enrich the content of this article with his useful and fruitful advice.

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The authors declare that there is no conflict of interests regarding the publication of this manuscript.

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