International Multi. J. of Pure Life, 13(45), 2026, 1-26

International Multidisciplinary Journal of Pure Life (IMJPL)

EISSN: 3041-8801

PAPER DERIVED FROM THESIS

Indigenous Values for Pure Living in Afghan Society: A Comparative-Historical Study

Roohallah Noori[1*], Akbar Hassanpoor[2], Yousef Vakili[3], Mohammad Mesbah Mesbah[2]

1.*Department of Human Resource Management, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran. (Corresponding Author)

2. Department of Human Resource Management, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran. a.hasanpoor@khu.ac.ir, mohammadmesbah@khu.ac.ir

3. Department of Organizational Behavior Management, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran. y.vakili@khu.ac.ir

ARTICLE INFO

Article History:

Received: 21 July 2025

Revised: 19 September 2025

Accepted: 20 October 2025

Key Words:

Indigenous Values

Pure Living

Afghan Society

Comparative-Historical Method

Public Administration

Jirga

Pashtunwali

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22034/imjpl.2026.12251

This is an open-access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

ABSTRACT

SUBJECT & OBJECTIVES: The concept of pure living represents a core yet insufficiently theorized element of Afghan indigenous governance thought. Drawing on three interconnected traditions, this study develops a five-dimensional framework of pure living comprising moral integrity, social harmony, environmental stewardship, spiritual authenticity, and intergenerational accountability. The analysis explicitly treats indigenous institutions as internally heterogeneous rather than uniformly beneficial, examining their exclusionary, gender-discriminatory, and conflict-generating dimensions alongside their integrative functions. Despite significant political and institutional transformations across eight governmental periods, indigenous governance institutions, including the Jirga (council), Pashtunwali (Pashtun tribal code), Ulema (scholars) networks, and Ashar (communal cooperation), have demonstrated remarkable resilience. The study examines the conditions under which these institutions have either supported or undermined pure living and human dignity, and identifies which components of which institutions are most closely associated with each outcome.

METHOD & FINDING: Using a qualitative comparative-historical approach, the research combines process tracing, comparative analysis, critical juncture assessment, qualitative content analysis, and thematic coding. Evidence was triangulated from official documents, 28 semi-structured interviews, and authoritative secondary sources. Analysis revealed six indigenous values consistently linked to pure living—consensual decision-making through Jirga, the Pashtunwali principles of hospitality and sanctuary, communal solidarity, moderate Ulema authority, environmental stewardship, and intergenerational knowledge transmission—and, concurrently, identified specific components of the same institutions (ethnically bounded Pashtunwali authority, Badal , Namus) that have functioned as mechanisms of exclusion, retaliatory violence, and gender subordination. These values proved most effective during periods of constructive, safeguarded cooperation between state and indigenous institutions, particularly under the Zahir Shah administration and the National Solidarity Program during the Karzai era.

CONCLUSION: Indigenous values remain active governance resources whose effects on legitimacy, social cohesion, and human dignity are conditional rather than uniform: the same institutions that sustained cooperation and welfare provision have also been used to justify ethnic hierarchy, gender subordination, and cycles of retaliatory violence. The quality and safeguarding of interaction between formal administrative systems and indigenous institutions emerges as the strongest predictor of governance performance across all periods. To promote sustainable governance, the study proposes a four-tier Hybrid Public Service Model based on institutional recognition, procedural integration, value codification, and explicit safeguards against the exclusionary uses of the same institutions. It also establishes pure living as a legitimate, but internally contested, criterion for evaluating governance quality alongside conventional administrative measures.

*** Corresponding Author:**

Email: *rnoori@khu.ac.ir*

ORCID: *0000-0003-2453-4683*

Article Address Published on the Journal Site:

http://p-l.journals.miu.ac.ir/article_12251.html

NUMBER OF REFERENCES	NUMBER OF AUTHORS	NATIONʿALĪTY OF AUTHOR
34	4	(Iran, Afghanistan)

Introduction

The concept of pure living occupies a central yet insufficiently theorized position in the study of Afghan indigenous governance. Unlike many foundational governance concepts imported into Afghan political discourse through international development frameworks, pure living is an endogenous category—embedded in the philosophical, religious, and practical traditions through which Afghan communities have organized collective life for centuries. It encompasses multiple interrelated dimensions: moral integrity in personal conduct (Nateghi & Shah-Naqavi, 2022); social purity in communal relations; spiritual authenticity in religious observance; and environmental stewardship in the sustainable management of land, water, and natural resources (Roy, 1995; Edwards, 2002).

While the term itself does not appear in formal administrative lexicons, the values it encapsulates—honesty, reciprocity, communal solidarity, spiritual integrity, and environmental responsibility—permeate the indigenous governance institutions that have structured Afghan public life across the full span of its modern political history.

This study's premise is not that indigenous institutions are inherently benevolent. *Pashtunwali*, the *Jirga*, and related institutions have functioned historically both as resources for legitimacy and welfare and as mechanisms of ethnic exclusion, gender subordination, and cyclical violence (Rubin, 1995; Giustozzi, 2000; Human Rights Watch, 2022). The analysis therefore treats indigenous values as contested and internally heterogeneous rather than as a uniform cultural good, and asks under what specific conditions their effects on governance and human dignity have been constructive versus destructive. This distinction—between an institution's existence and the specific, sometimes divergent, uses to which it has been put—organizes the analysis that follows and is the study's central conceptual contribution.

Afghanistan presents a rare and analytically valuable comparative case for the study of indigenous values in public administration. Over the past century, the country has traversed eight distinct governmental periods encompassing virtually the full ideological spectrum available to modern states: constitutional monarchy, reformist nationalism, Soviet-aligned Marxism, Islamic resistance coalition, Taliban theocracy, internationally supported electoral democracy, and a second theocratic period with intensified ideological rigidity. Each period imposed its own administrative values—and each, to varying degrees, stood in competition with the indigenous frameworks that

governed the daily lives of the overwhelming majority of Afghans living outside of Kabul and other urban centers.

What is theoretically remarkable about this century-long sequence is not the diversity of formal administrative systems imposed upon Afghan society, but rather the persistence—and contested character—of indigenous institutions across all of them (Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2004). The *Jirga* continued to resolve community disputes when courts were inaccessible, corrupt, or nonexistent, though its consensus norms did not extend equally to non-Pashtun communities in ethnically mixed districts; the *Ulema* networks continued to provide moral guidance and legal interpretation when formal judicial systems collapsed; *Pashtunwali* continued both to protect community members through *Melmastia* (lit: hospitality) and *Nanawatai* (lit: sanctuary/asylum) and, through *Badal* and *Namus*, to sustain cycles of retaliatory violence and gender restriction when formal legal protections were absent; and *Ashar* networks continued to organize collective labor and resource management when state service delivery failed. This institutional resilience, in both its constructive and destructive forms, demands systematic scholarly attention.

This study addresses five interconnected analytical questions:

1. Why have indigenous values for pure living demonstrated such extraordinary resilience across eight fundamentally different governance regimes?
2. Under what conditions have these values most effectively promoted human dignity, social cohesion, and ethical administration?
3. Under what conditions have the same institutions instead undermined human dignity, entrenched ethnic or gender hierarchy, or fueled conflict?
4. How have indigenous values been instrumentalized, suppressed, or distorted by successive formal administrative systems, and with what consequences for governance quality?
5. What does one century of systematic comparative evidence suggest for the future design of governance in Afghanistan and analogous fragile states?

These questions are addressed through a comparative-historical analysis of all eight governmental periods, applying five integrated analytical techniques derived from Mahoney (2004) and Lange's (2013) comparative-historical methodology, Van Evera's (1997) process-tracing framework, and Capoccia and Kelemen's (2007) critical juncture analysis. The study draws on the

author's broader doctoral research on public administration values in Afghanistan, focusing specifically on the ninth analytical dimension—indigenous values and informal institutions (INDIG)—and its interactions with formal governance structures across all periods. This focus enables both the depth of single-dimension analysis and the breadth of century-long comparative perspective, filling a significant gap in the existing literature on Afghan public administration and fragile state governance theory.

Conceptual Framework

1. Indigenous Values

Indigenous values refer to socially transmitted principles of conduct, obligation, judgment, and collective responsibility that emerge from the historical experience of a particular community and acquire legitimacy through continued social recognition and practice. They differ from formally enacted administrative values because their authority is not derived primarily from legislation or bureaucratic hierarchy; rather, it is reproduced through family, elders, religious authorities, customary practices, communal expectations, and intergenerational transmission. In the Afghan context, indigenous values are therefore understood as historically embedded normative resources that have influenced how communities interpret responsibility, reciprocity, dispute resolution, hospitality, authority, and social obligation (Barfield, 2010; Shahrani, 2002).

This definition is deliberately non-romantic and non-uniform. Indigenous does not mean inherently ethical, democratic, inclusive, or universally applicable. A value may strengthen solidarity within a community while simultaneously creating boundaries between insiders and outsiders. For example, *Melmastia* and *Nanawatai* can provide mechanisms of protection and social support, whereas *Badal* (lit: retaliatory reciprocity) and some interpretations of *Namus* (lit: honor associated with family and women's conduct) can contribute to retaliation, gender restrictions, or exclusion. Accordingly, this study treats indigenous values as empirically variable normative resources, whose consequences depend on the institutional and political conditions under which they are activated. This approach is consistent with the study's finding that the same indigenous institutions have historically contained both integrative and exclusionary elements.

Pure Living

Pure living is the study's central evaluative concept. It refers not simply to ritual or personal purity but to a broader condition in which individual and collective conduct is oriented

toward moral integrity, social harmony, responsible stewardship, spiritual authenticity, and responsibility toward future generations. The concept consequently provides an evaluative bridge between personal ethical conduct and the quality of communal governance. Rather than equating pure living with any particular Afghan institution, the study uses it to examine whether particular practices and institutional arrangements contribute to or undermine human dignity and socially sustainable forms of collective life.

For analytical purposes, pure living is specified through five dimensions: moral integrity, social harmony, environmental stewardship, spiritual authenticity, and intergenerational accountability. These dimensions should be understood as analytical criteria rather than as assumptions about Afghan culture. Thus, *Jirga* deliberation may contribute to social harmony when it facilitates inclusive consensus and peaceful dispute resolution, while the same institution may undermine that dimension when participation is restricted by ethnicity or gender. Similarly, *Pashtunwali* may contribute to pure living through hospitality and sanctuary but undermine it when retaliatory or exclusionary elements dominate. This distinction prevents the concept from becoming a generalized claim that indigenous practices are inherently virtuous. In this study, whether a particular practice supports or undermines pure living is therefore an empirical question determined through historical and interview evidence, rather than a value judgment imposed in advance.

Indigenous Institutions

Indigenous institutions are relatively durable systems of social authority, decision-making, cooperation, dispute resolution, and norm enforcement that operate through locally recognized structures and practices rather than solely through formal state bureaucracy. Institutions in this sense include not only organizational structures but also the rules, expectations, roles, and relationships through which communities organize collective affairs. In Afghanistan, important examples include *Jirga* and *Shura*, *Ulema* networks, communal labor arrangements such as *Ashar*, and customary normative systems associated with *Pashtunwali* (Barfield, 2010; Edwards, 2002).

The conceptual distinction between indigenous values and indigenous institutions is important for the present study. Values constitute normative principles or expectations, whereas institutions provide social mechanisms through which some of those principles are interpreted, transmitted, negotiated, or enforced. A *Jirga*, for example, is an institutional mechanism for collective

deliberation; consensus, reciprocity, mediation, and communal responsibility are values that may be expressed through that mechanism. Likewise, *Ashar* represents a form of organized communal cooperation through which solidarity and mutual obligation become observable practices. This distinction enables the analysis to avoid treating an institution as a single homogeneous entity: an institution may preserve particular values while simultaneously reproducing unequal power relations. The study therefore examines which institutional components operate constructively, which operate coercively, and under what contextual conditions.

Customary Law: *ʿUrf* and *Adat*

Customary law refers to socially established norms and practices that acquire practical authority through collective acceptance, repetition, and community enforcement. In Islamic and Muslim-majority societies, the concept overlaps with the jurisprudential notion of *ʿurf*, meaning recognized custom, and with the broader comparative concept of *adat*, commonly used to denote customary norms or customary law. These concepts should not, however, be treated as exact synonyms in every historical or legal context. Their significance lies in identifying normative orders that coexist with, interact with, and sometimes compete with formal state law and religious jurisprudence.

For Afghanistan, this distinction is particularly important because customary norms have historically existed alongside Islamic legal authority and state law. The relationship is therefore better conceptualized as interaction and negotiation among overlapping normative orders, rather than as a simple opposition between “tradition” and “modernity.” The manuscript itself notes the classical jurisprudential principle that recognized custom may carry legal relevance where it does not contradict explicit religious sources, while also documenting tensions between customary practices and Islamic legal claims. In the present framework, *adat/ʿurf* is consequently treated as a contextual normative mechanism, not as proof that all customary practices possess equal legitimacy. This distinction is especially relevant when evaluating practices affecting women's rights, inheritance, physical security, or intergroup equality.

Pashtunwali

Pashtunwali is understood in this study as a historically developed and internally differentiated normative code associated primarily with Pashtun communities. It should not be reduced to a single “tribal value.” Rather, it

consists of multiple principles and practices that regulate hospitality, sanctuary, honor, reciprocity, family obligations, conflict, and social relationships. Among its commonly discussed components are *Melmastia*, *Nanawatai*, *Badal*, *Nang* (lit: honor), and *Namus* (lit: family honor and associated expectations concerning women's conduct) (Barfield, 2010; Rubin, 1995).

The analytical importance of Pashtunwali lies precisely in this internal heterogeneity. Its protective elements can function as informal welfare and conflict-management mechanisms, particularly where formal state capacity is weak. *Melmastia*, for example, can extend material and social support beyond the capacity of formal institutions, while *Nanawatai* can provide refuge to vulnerable persons. Conversely, *Badal* may sustain cycles of retaliation, and *Namus* can be associated with restrictions on women's autonomy. Moreover, because Pashtunwali is historically rooted in Pashtun social organization, its elevation to a national governance principle raises questions of ethnic inclusion and political legitimacy for non-Pashtun communities. The study therefore does not ask whether Pashtunwali is “good” or “bad”; it asks which components produce which consequences, for whom, and under what institutional safeguards. This approach is essential given the manuscript's own recognition that the evidence regarding Jirga and Pashtunwali legitimacy is stronger in Pashtun-majority contexts than for non-Pashtun populations.

Constructive Hybridization

Constructive hybridization refers to the deliberate combination of legitimate and socially functional elements of indigenous governance with the procedural, legal, and accountability mechanisms of formal public administration. It is not equivalent to simply incorporating traditional institutions into the state. Rather, hybridization becomes constructive when indigenous mechanisms retain their locally recognized sources of legitimacy while operating within institutional arrangements that protect equality, individual rights, transparency, and accountability.

This concept provides the principal relational mechanism linking the preceding concepts. Indigenous values supply locally meaningful normative resources; indigenous institutions provide mechanisms through which those values are enacted; formal administrative institutions provide legal authority, procedural regularity, and safeguards; and pure living provides the evaluative lens through which the consequences of this interaction are assessed. The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) and its Community Development Councils

provide the study's principal historical illustration: elements of *Jirga*-style deliberation and community participation were incorporated into formal administrative structures while safeguards and procedural requirements were introduced. The study therefore conceptualizes constructive hybridization as conditional rather than inherently beneficial: integration without safeguards can reproduce exclusion, just as the complete suppression of indigenous institutions can weaken locally legitimate mechanisms of cooperation and dispute resolution.

Conceptual Integration

Taken together, these concepts establish the analytical logic of the study. Indigenous values constitute the normative content; indigenous institutions provide the social mechanisms through which that content is enacted; *ʿurf/adat* (customary law) represents the broader normative environment within which customary practices acquire authority; and Pashtunwali represents a historically important but internally heterogeneous indigenous normative system in Afghanistan. Pure living serves as the evaluative construct through which the consequences of these values and institutions are assessed, while constructive hybridization describes the institutional condition under which indigenous resources may be combined with formal governance without reproducing their exclusionary dimensions.

Accordingly, the framework does not assume a linear relationship between indigenous governance and positive outcomes. Instead, it proposes a conditional relationship: indigenous institutions are more likely to contribute to pure living when constructive values such as consensual deliberation, hospitality, sanctuary, communal cooperation, ethical authority, and intergenerational responsibility are activated within inclusive and accountable institutional arrangements. Conversely, the same institutional environment may undermine pure living when coercive, retaliatory, ethnically bounded, or gender-exclusionary elements become dominant. The comparative analysis of the eight governmental periods consequently examines not merely whether indigenous institutions were present or absent, but how they were engaged, which value components were activated, what safeguards existed, and what consequences followed for social cohesion, human dignity, and governance quality. This logic provides the conceptual foundation for the subsequent comparative-historical analysis and for the proposed Hybrid Public Service Model.

Literature Review

Scholarly engagement with Afghan indigenous values has grown substantially since 2001, though the specific lens of "pure living" as an administrative value framework remains novel, and the literature remains divided between two broadly opposed readings that this review brings into direct comparison rather than presenting sequentially.

One line of scholarship treats indigenous institutions primarily as resources for stability and legitimacy: Barfield (2010) argues that the most stable Afghan governments "worked with rather than against the grain of local custom" (p. 198); Shahrani (2002) documents how sustained conflict paradoxically strengthened indigenous governance institutions; and the National Solidarity Program (NSP) documentation (World Bank, 2005; AREU, 2007) provides empirical evidence of successful institutional hybridization.

A second, more critical line of scholarship emphasizes the same institutions' role in producing and perpetuating conflict and exclusion: Rubin (1995) shows how the "rentier state" interacted with tribal and ethnic fragmentation to produce state collapse; Giustozzi (2000, 2007) documents how commanders acting under indigenous and Islamic banners built exploitative warlord economies that violated the ethical norms those banners invoked; and Roy (1986, , 1995) traces how political Islam and tribal politics jointly distorted customary values in ways that intensified rather than contained violence. Edwards (2002) occupies a middle position, tracing how indigenous concepts of honor and moral authority were mobilized both to legitimate resistance and to justify its excesses.

These two readings are rarely brought into direct comparison within a single study, and neither, on its own, specifies the conditions under which indigenous institutions behave one way rather than the other. This is the first gap this paper addresses: it evaluates the same six indigenous values against evidence of both their integrative and their exclusionary effects across all eight governmental periods of the past century, treating the divergence between the two readings in the literature as itself a finding to be explained rather than a debate to be adjudicated in advance. The second gap is methodological: no existing study conducts a systematic, standardized comparison of indigenous-value conditions across all eight governmental periods using a single analytical framework; most accounts focus on one or two periods in depth. This paper addresses that gap through the comparative-historical design.

Research Method

This study employs a qualitative, comparative-historical research design grounded in the philosophical framework of critical realism (Bhaskar, 1975, 1998), for the reasons set out above. Critical realism posits that social reality consists of observable events, underlying mechanisms, and deep structures—a stratification that allows for both descriptive and explanatory analysis of how indigenous values operate across different institutional contexts.

The comparative-historical method follows Mahoney (2004) and Lange (2013), treating each of the eight governmental periods as a distinct case study while systematically comparing them across standardized analytical dimensions. Mill's (1843) methods of agreement and difference are applied to determine which conditions most consistently promote or undermine indigenous pure living values.

Data Collection: Data were triangulated from three primary sources following Denzin's (1978) triangulation framework:

1) Official documents including Afghan constitutions (1923, , 1964, , 2004), government decrees, and international reports (SIGAR, UNAMA, World Bank);
2) 28 in-depth semi-structured interviews with historians, former government officials, scholars, activists, and community witnesses (coded M01–M28);
3) Authoritative secondary literature as reviewed above. Trustworthiness was ensured through prolonged engagement, member checking, audit trail maintenance, and triangulation.

Participants were recruited through purposive and snowball sampling designed to maximize variation across the eight governmental periods, occupational background (government officials, religious scholars, civil society actors, and community members), gender, and geographic origin. Eligibility required either direct professional experience with formal or indigenous governance institutions during at least one of the eight periods, or documented community-level knowledge transmitted through family or local networks. Recruitment proceeded iteratively: each interview concluded with a request for referrals to individuals with a different vantage point on the period under discussion, and sampling continued until successive interviews (M26–M28) ceased to yield new analytical categories, at which point theoretical saturation was judged to have been reached (Patton, 2015).

Eighteen of the 28 participants were interviewed in diaspora settings (Germany, Pakistan, and elsewhere); this composition is a limitation discussed further below, since diaspora perspectives may be more inclined

either to idealize pre-departure conditions or, conversely, to emphasize the abuses that precipitated departure, and both tendencies were addressed in the coding process by cross-checking diaspora testimony against in-country sources and documentary evidence.

Eight Indigenous Values for Pure Living: Comparative-Historical Analysis

1. *Jirga*-Based Consensual Governance

The *Jirga* represents the most institutionally developed indigenous framework for pure living in Afghan society. Its core value—that legitimate decisions emerge from consensual deliberation among affected parties rather than from hierarchical command—is associated in this evidence with accountability, participation, and communal dignity, most consistently where deliberation extended across, rather than only within, ethnic and factional lines.

During the extended period the *Loya Jirga* (grand council) of exemplifies constructive cooperation at its finest. The 452 delegates engaged in genuine deliberation, producing Afghanistan's most sophisticated constitutional document. Participant M05 (former Ministry of Education official, 78 years old): "The 1964 *Jirga* was real. People argued, disagreed, and finally agreed. This is what made it legitimate."

In stark contrast, the PDPA period declared the *Jirga* a "feudal institution." Participant M16 (former Mujahideen commander, 68 years old): "When the communists came, they called our elders feudal. But our elders kept peace. Without them, there was only war." The Karzai era produced the most extensive experiment through the NSP Community Development Councils. Participant M21 (civil society activist, 40 years old): "The NSP councils were not perfect *Jirgas*. But they had the spirit of *Jirga*—people sat together, talked, and decided."

2. *Pashtunwali*: Hospitality and Sanctuary Alongside Exclusion and Retaliatory Violence

Pashtunwali is best understood not as a single value but as an internally heterogeneous code whose component principles have pulled in different directions across Afghan history. *Melmastia* requires hosts to provide for guests regardless of their own circumstances—a form of unconditional welfare supplementing state services. *Nanawatai* protects the vulnerable: the debtor, the fleeing widow, the politically persecuted. These two principles are the values most consistently associated with pure living in the evidence gathered for this study.

At the same time, *Pashtunwali* is an ethnically specific code, historically

elaborated by and for Pashtun communities, and its extension into a national governance resource has recurrently disadvantaged non-Pashtun Afghans—Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, and Turkmen communities among them—who are not party to its internal mechanisms of obligation and reciprocity and who have, at various points, experienced its invocation as a vehicle for Pashtun political dominance rather than a neutral ethical resource (Rubin, 1995; Barfield, 2010). *Badal* has been a documented driver of multigenerational blood feuds and, at the level of factional politics, of cycles of revenge violence that outside actors have repeatedly exploited to fragment Afghan communities against one another (Giustozzi, 2000; Rubin, 1995). *Namus*, the imperative to control and protect female family members' conduct, has functioned historically as a mechanism of severe restriction on women's autonomy independent of any state ideology, and has provided a customary vocabulary that both tribal authorities and, later, Taliban authorities could draw upon to justify constraints on women (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

Governmental periods that acknowledged *Pashtunwali*'s protective functions—*Melmastia* and *Nanawatai* in particular—without deferring to its exclusionary and retaliatory functions appear, on the evidence gathered here, to have achieved greater local legitimacy. Participant M02 (Professor of Public Administration, 65 years old) recalled that if you had a land dispute, you could go to court or go to the elder, and that most people chose the elder because they trusted him, and that the government was reluctant to contest this arrangement. This testimony, however, describes the experience of a Pashtun-majority locality; it does not speak to how non-Pashtun communities experienced the same institutional configuration, a limitation of the interview sample addressed further below.

The Taliban's use of *Pashtunwali* is better described as selective amplification than as pure distortion: the movement emphasized *Badal* and *Namus* while suppressing *Melmastia* and *Nanawatai*, but *Badal* and *Namus* were not Taliban inventions grafted onto an otherwise benign code—they are long-standing, and at times harshly applied, components of *Pashtunwali* in their own right. Participant M27 (Afghan woman, immigrant in Germany, 45 years old) described the shift precisely in these terms: "*Pashtunwali* used to protect women through *Nanawatai*—even enemies must protect a woman who seeks shelter. The Taliban kept the word but changed the meaning." Read alongside the ethnic-exclusion and *Badal* evidence above, this suggests a code whose protective and coercive

elements have coexisted throughout the period under study, with successive administrations shifting the balance between them rather than introducing coercion into a previously harmonious system.

3. *Ashar* (Communal Solidarity) and Environmental Stewardship

Ashar—communal labor for collective benefit—embodies values of solidarity, reciprocity, and environmental stewardship. Historically, *Ashar* organized construction and maintenance of *karez* (irrigation channels), crop harvests, and emergency response.

The PDPA's attempted collectivization is associated in this evidence with a severe disruption of this system. Participant M14 (PDPA-era refugee, woman, 60 years old): "In our village, we had always shared water. Everyone knew their turn. The communists said this was feudal. Within one year, people were fighting over water. Before the communists, I cannot remember a water fight."

Afghan customary law contains sophisticated frameworks for managing pasture rotation, forest preservation, and water allocation—embedded in community agreements enforced through social pressure. The collapse of these frameworks during 1978–2001 appears, on the evidence available, to have contributed to environmental degradation that continues to affect communities.

4. Moderate *Ulema* Authority and Islamic Pure Living Values

The *Ulema* (religious scholars) serve as moral arbiters, legal interpreters, and educational providers. Their authority derives from religious knowledge, personal integrity, and community trust.

The PDPA's removal of moderate *Ulema* figures is treated in this study as one of the most consequential administrative decisions in the historical record examined. Participant M15 (former PDPA official, 65 years old): "We made a terrible mistake with the *Ulema*. We thought they were the enemy. But they were the conscience of the village. Without them, who would tell people what is right?" This vacuum was subsequently filled in part by Pakistani Deobandi-trained scholars whose more rigid interpretation is associated with the later emergence of Taliban ideology; during the Karzai period, the Afghanistan *Ulema* Council was formally integrated into the constitutional framework, an approach this study's evidence associates with improved outcomes relative to both exclusion and unregulated informal authority.

5. Contested Alternatives to Indigenous Governance: Modernization, Revolution, and Islamist Critique

The comparative-historical record also contains three sustained attempts to move Afghan governance away from indigenous and tribal frameworks altogether, and a full account of indigenous values' resilience must take seriously why each of these attempts arose and what it accomplished, rather than treating them only as episodes of suppression.

Daoud Khan's republic is best read as a genuinely modernizing, nation-building project rather than simple neglect of indigenous institutions. Daoud's administration pursued centralized bureaucratic authority, a unified national legal system, and technocratic development planning explicitly intended to reduce the salience of tribal and ethnic loyalties in public life (Gregorian, 1969; Dupree, 1980). That this project ultimately weakened without replacing indigenous governance capacity—leaving a partial vacuum exploited by the PDPA—reflects the difficulty of the modernizing project rather than evidence against its underlying rationale. An earlier draft of this study characterized the period as one of "benign neglect"; that framing understated the deliberateness of Daoud's centralizing agenda, and the account here instead treats the Daoud period as a contested case of state-led modernization whose failure illustrates the difficulty, not the illegitimacy, of transcending tribal governance.

The PDPA period while responsible for the most severe documented ruptures of indigenous social organization examined in this study—including the collectivization campaigns described by Participant M14 and the removal of moderate *Ulema* (religious scholars) described by Participant M15—also pursued land reform, expanded women's access to education and public employment, and formal commitments to ethnic equality that responded to real and long-standing grievances against tribal and landlord hierarchies (Amnesty International, 1983; Rubin, 1995). Leftist mobilization in this period is therefore better understood, in part, as a response to the perceived inability of tribal and monarchical structures to deliver equitable justice, even though the methods used to pursue these aims—mass displacement, political violence, and the elimination of religious and communal authority structures—produced the severe breakdown in social trust and environmental management documented above.

Islamist movements, including the Mujahideen factions and both Taliban administrations, are described elsewhere in this study as having "distorted" *Pashtunwali*. Those

framing risks underestimate a genuine theological position. In classical Islamic jurisprudence, *ʿurf* (custom) is recognized as a subsidiary source of law under the maxim *al-ʿurf muhakkam* (custom is authoritative), but only insofar as it does not contradict *naṣṣ* (explicit textual sources); where a conflict arises, *ʿurf* is subordinated to Sharia. This adjudicated relationship between tribal custom and Islamic legal authority is not unique to Afghanistan—a structurally similar tension between customary *adat* (customary law) and Sharia has been documented across Central Asia and the Caucasus, where colonial and Soviet-era administrations institutionalized parallel *adat* and Sharia courts precisely because the two normative orders did not fully converge (Roy, 1986). Representatives of Mujahideen and Taliban movements drew on this jurisprudential lineage to argue, on textual and legal grounds, that practices such as *Badal*-driven vengeance or restrictions on women's inheritance rights under customary law are themselves deviations from Sharia to be corrected rather than defended (Roy, 1986; Rashid, 2000).

Whether this study's evidence supports or contradicts that jurisprudential claim is beyond its scope; the relevant point is that Islamist rejection of tribal authority was, in significant part, a genuine theological argument continuous with a longer *ʿurf*–Sharia debate in Islamic legal history, rather than only a strategic distortion of indigenous values for political ends—even where the practical governance record of these movements, documented extensively by Human Rights Watch (2022) and UNAMA (2022), involved severe violations of the human-dignity criteria this study uses to evaluate pure living.

6. Intergenerational Knowledge Transmission

Afghan indigenous pure living values are transmitted through intergenerational networks—oral traditions, apprenticeship systems, family lineages, and community storytelling. These preserve practical wisdom, ethical principles, and technical knowledge.

Participant M25 (medical student, 28 years old): "My grandfather knew how to manage water in the fields, how to read the weather, how to keep peace between families. This knowledge is gone now. The NGO workers know how to write reports, but they do not know how to read the land."

Mass displacement of over five million Afghans during 1979–1989 appears, on the evidence gathered, to have broken intergenerational knowledge chains in many cases. Young men who grew up in Pakistani refugee camps were largely denied access to the indigenous educational

tradition that would have transmitted balanced values of pure living.

7. Contextual Analysis: Eight Periods and Indigenous Value Conditions

In this part, a period-by-period contextual analysis shows how indigenous institutions and value systems interacted with the Afghan state across eight major governmental periods, from the Kingdom to the second Taliban period. Rather than treating indigenous values as inherently positive or negative, an upcoming table distinguishes between their constructive, protective dimensions—such as communal solidarity, consensual decision-making, *Melmastia*, *Nanawatai*, and mediation through *Jirga*—and their potentially exclusionary or coercive dimensions, including *Badal*, *Namus*, patronage, gender restrictions, and ethnically concentrated legitimacy. This distinction is important because the social consequences of indigenous institutions depended substantially on the political and institutional context in which they operated. The eight periods therefore illustrate different modes of state–indigenous interaction: cooperation, centralization, suppression, weaponization, selective amplification, safeguarded integration, technocratic bypass, and theocratic monopoly. The "Pure Living Value Conditions" column captures the extent to which indigenous values could function as sources of communal wellbeing, dignity, reciprocity, and social cohesion. In contrast, the "Exclusionary / Contested Dimension" column identifies the limits, contradictions, and groups that could be marginalized under the same value system. The table should consequently be read as a contextual and historically contingent analysis, not as a linear judgment that indigenous governance was either beneficial or harmful. The Karzai-era experience, particularly through the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) and Community Development Councils (CDCs), is presented as a notable example of how indigenous participatory mechanisms could be incorporated into formal governance while being accompanied by institutional safeguards.

Table 1: Indigenous Pure Living Values - Conditions and Contested Dimensions Across Eight Governmental Periods

Period	**Relationship with Indigenous Institutions**	**Pure Living Value Conditions**	**Key Indigenous Value Mechanism**	**Exclusionary / Contested Dimension**
Kingdom (1919–73)	Constructive cooperation - Jirga and Ulema respected	Best conditions: communal ethics, consensual governance	Constructive state-indigenous partnership; 40-year stability	Jirga and Pashtunwali legitimacy remained concentrated in Pashtun-majority areas; limited evidence on non-Pashtun experience
Daoud Republic (1973–78)	Deliberate modernizing centralization, not mere neglect	Declining: urbanization pressure on communal values	Nation-building centralization; weakened without replacing local capacity	Genuine attempt to transcend tribal loyalty; failure reflects difficulty, not illegitimacy, of that project
PDPA (1978–92)	Active suppression - 'feudal institutions' eliminated	Catastrophic: mass displacement destroys communal bonds	Elimination of Ulema; Ashar destroyed	Simultaneously pursued land reform, women's education, and ethnic-equality claims responding to real tribal-era grievances
Mujahideen (1992–96)	Weaponization - indigenous values used to justify violence	Collapse: pure living values instrumentalized	Badal dominates over Melmastia; warlordism displaces elders	Badal and factional rivalry, not only external suppression, independently drove civil-war fragmentation
Taliban I (1996–01)	Selective amplification of Badal/Namus within Pashtunwali	Severely limited: safety for men, elimination for women	Deobandi-influenced emphasis on pre-existing coercive components	Genuine (if contested) theological objection to tribal custom coexisted with severe rights violations
Karzai (2001–14)	Hybrid, safeguarded integration - NSP as best-practice model	Improving: NSP councils create genuine participatory spaces	CDCs integrate Jirga values into formal admin with rights safeguards	Most successful case in dataset on both integration and safeguard dimensions
Ghani (2014–21)	Technocratic bypass - indigenous institutions marginalized	Stagnating: formal systems unable to fill indigenous gap	Technocratic neglect; local elites negotiate independently with Taliban by 2021	Bypass without safeguards left ethnic-exclusion and gender dynamics unaddressed rather than resolved
Taliban II (2021–25)	Theocratic monopoly - all indigenous diversity suppressed	Severely deteriorating: gender apartheid violates ethics	Nanawatai and Melmastia distorted; women excluded	Coercive components (Namus, Badal) amplified while protective components (Melmastia, Nanawatai) suppressed

8. The Hybrid Public Service Model (HPSM)

The comparative analysis yields a conditional finding rather than a categorical one: formal integration of indigenous pure living values improves governance and human-dignity outcomes only when integration is accompanied by explicit safeguards against the same institutions' exclusionary and coercive tendencies documented above. This study proposes a four-tier Hybrid Public Service Model (HPSM), extending the three-tier version of earlier drafts with an explicit safeguards tier.

Tier One – Institutional Recognition: Formal constitutional and legal recognition of indigenous governance institutions as legitimate components of public administration. This means legal recognition of *Jirga* (council) decisions, formal roles for *Ulema* (religious scholar) councils, and legal protection for *Ashar* (communal labor) arrangements.

Tier Two – Procedural Integration: Development of administrative procedures that channel rather than bypass indigenous decision-making. The NSP Community Development Councils represent the most successful example: elections-based but incorporating elder authority, formal budgeting but managed through communal deliberation.

Tier Three – Value Codification: Translation of indigenous pure living values into formal administrative codes of ethics and performance standards. Values such as *Melmastia*, *Ashar*, and *Jirga*-based accountability (transparent deliberation) can be formalized without losing their indigenous character; *Badal* and *Namus* are deliberately excluded from codification, consistent with the analysis above identifying these as the components of *Pashtunwali* most associated with exclusionary and coercive outcomes. (See Figure 1.)

Tier Four – Safeguards Against Exclusion: Formal mechanisms ensuring that institutional recognition (Tier One) and procedural integration (Tier Two) do not reproduce ethnic or gender hierarchy: guaranteed non-Pashtun representation in any legally recognized *Jirga* or council structure operating in multi-ethnic districts; statutory limits preventing customary bodies from adjudicating matters of physical safety, marriage, or inheritance in ways that override individual rights protections; and independent oversight mechanisms, modeled on safeguards embedded in the NSP Community Development Council design, empowered to

review and, where necessary, override customary decisions that violate constitutional protections.

In practice, this tier would operate as follows. Consider a land-boundary dispute in a mixed Pashtun–Tajik district, of the kind the classical, unsafeguarded *Jirga* model has historically struggled to resolve impartially where authority defaults to the ethnic majority. Under the HPSM's Tier Four, adjudication would proceed through a CDC-style body constituted with guaranteed seats for both communities rather than a single-ethnicity council of elders; its proceedings and evidentiary basis would be recorded and open to review by an independent oversight office—analogous to the facilitating-partner oversight built into the NSP's Community Development Council design—with statutory authority to annul a ruling found to rest on ethnic bias rather than the documented merits of the claim. This does not remove the dispute from customary deliberation; it embeds that deliberation within a structure that can be audited and, where necessary, overridden, which is precisely the combination of "intermediate-to-high engagement with high safeguard strength" that Table 1 associates with the best-performing case in the dataset.

Variables and mechanisms: The model's central causal claim is that governance legitimacy (dependent variable) is jointly a function of indigenous-institution engagement (independent variable, ranging from suppression to uncritical deference) and safeguard strength (moderating variable, ranging from absent to robust). The comparative evidence in Table 1 indicates that legitimacy and human-dignity outcomes are highest not at either end of the engagement axis but at intermediate-to-high engagement combined with high safeguard strength, as in the NSP case, while intermediate engagement without safeguards—for example, formal acknowledgment of *Pashtunwali* authority without corresponding protections—does not reliably outperform suppression on gender-related outcomes specifically.

Figure 1. The Hybrid Public Service Model (HPSM) - four tiers: Recognition, Integration, Codification, Safeguards.



Conclusion

This comparative-historical study has systematically demonstrated, across eight governmental periods spanning one century of Afghan political history, that indigenous values for pure living—encompassing *Jirga*-based consensus governance, *Pashtunwali*'s ethics of hospitality and sanctuary, *Ashar* (communal solidarity), moderate *Ulema* authority, environmental stewardship, and intergenerational knowledge transmission—constitute neither uniformly benevolent cultural inheritances nor obstacles to be transcended, but structurally central and internally contested determinants of effective public administration whose effects on legitimacy, cohesion, and human dignity depend on how, and by whom, they are engaged (Barfield, 2010; Rubin, 1995; Shahrani, 2002).

The discussion analysis, across five analytical dimensions and against three primary theoretical frameworks (Bhaskar's critical realism, Riggs' prismatic bureaucracy theory, and Denhardt and Denhardt's New Public Service framework), yields four principal conclusions:

1. The study establishes empirically—through the systematic application of Mill's (1843) methods of agreement and difference—that the variable most consistently differentiating periods of relative governance success from periods of governance collapse is not

ideological orientation, external financial support, or military capability, but the quality and safeguarding of the relationship between formal administrative systems and indigenous governance institutions. Periods characterized by constructive, safeguarded state-indigenous cooperation consistently produced the highest scores across all nine analytical dimensions. Periods characterized by active suppression or weaponization of indigenous values produced the most severe administrative dysfunction and human-dignity violations. These findings challenge technocratic state-building approaches that treat indigenous institutions only as obstacles (Ghani & Lockhart, 2008; SIGAR, 2021), while equally cautioning against approaches that treat them only as an undifferentiated resource.

2. The study advances a theoretical concept—"constructive hybridization"—to describe the governance model that produced the most durable pure living conditions in Afghan history. Drawing on Pierson's (2004) path dependency theory and Capoccia and Kelemen's (2007) critical juncture framework, the analysis demonstrates that the National Solidarity Program represents the most successful institutional experiment in Afghan administrative history precisely because it translated *Jirga* deliberative values into formally recognized Community Development Councils with rights safeguards, creating a hybrid governance architecture that was simultaneously legitimate in indigenous terms and functional in modern administrative terms (World Bank, 2005; AREU, 2007). The theoretical implication is that sustainable governance in societies with strong indigenous institutional traditions requires safeguarded hybridization—not uncritical replacement in either direction—as the foundational design principle.
3. The concept of "pure living" as operationalized in this study—encompassing moral integrity, social harmony, environmental stewardship, spiritual authenticity, and intergenerational accountability—constitutes a theoretically defensible and empirically measurable supplement to conventional public administration performance criteria. Existing frameworks, including Weber's (1978) legal-rational bureaucratic ideal, Riggs' (1964) prismatic bureaucracy model, and the New Public Service framework (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015), do not adequately capture the governance dimensions that

matter most to communities with deep indigenous institutional traditions. The "pure living" framework bridges this analytical gap, offering a culturally grounded yet theoretically rigorous evaluative lens with potential generalizability beyond Afghanistan to other Islamic societies with strong customary governance traditions (Edwards, 2002; Roy, 1995).

4. The study's evidence indicates that indigenous institutions' governance effects are not unidirectional: the same institutional resources that sustained welfare provision and dispute resolution (*Melmastia*, *Ashar*, consensual *Jirga* deliberation) coexisted, often within the same period and institution, with mechanisms of ethnic exclusion and gender subordination (ethnically bounded *Pashtunwali* authority, *Badal*, *Namus*). This heterogeneity means that policy recommendations built on this research cannot treat "indigenous values" as a single variable to be maximized; they must instead specify which components of which institutions are being engaged, and under what safeguards—a distinction operationalized in the fourth tier of the HPSM above.

Limitations and Future Research Directions

This study acknowledges four methodological limitations. First, access constraints to internal administrative documents from PDPA and both Taliban periods limited the evidentiary base for these eras relative to better-documented periods. Second, the predominance of diaspora-based interview participants (18 of 28) introduces potential selection bias, discussed above in the Research Method section, toward perspectives of those who left Afghanistan, potentially underrepresenting the views of those who remained. Third, the study's focus on national-level governance necessarily obscures considerable variation in indigenous governance quality across Afghanistan's diverse regional, ethnic, and geographic contexts.

Fourth, the interview sample, while diverse in occupational background, is not ethnically balanced in a way that allows this study to assess non-Pashtun experiences of indigenous institutions with the same evidentiary depth as Pashtun experiences; several of the study's claims about the legitimacy of *Jirga*- and *Pashtunwali*-based dispute resolution rest more heavily on testimony from Pashtun-majority contexts than the general framing of these institutions as pan-Afghan resources might suggest. This is a substantive limitation, not only a

methodological one, and future research should prioritize comparative sampling across ethnic communities to test whether the hybridization findings reported here generalize beyond Pashtun-majority localities.

Future research should extend this comparative-historical framework to sub-national levels, examining indigenous governance variation across provinces and ethnic communities; conduct longitudinal analysis of the NSP Community Development Councils to assess long-term sustainability of hybrid governance models and their safeguard mechanisms specifically; investigate analogous hybridization experiments in comparable Islamic societies (Yemen, Somalia, Mali); and develop quantitative indicators for the "pure living" framework, disaggregated by ethnicity and gender, to enable cross-national comparative measurement.

For any future governance arrangement in Afghanistan—regardless of political character—the central lesson of one hundred years of comparative evidence is that indigenous values for pure living have proven durable rather than permanently eliminable, and that their integration without safeguards, no less than their suppression, has produced serious governance failures in this historical record. Future state-builders who treat these institutions as either a uniform obstacle to be swept aside or a uniform resource to be uncritically restored do so, on the evidence assembled here, at the cost of the populations they claim to serve.

Acknowledgment

The author expresses sincere gratitude to the 28 research participants (coded M01–M28) whose testimonies provided the evidentiary foundation for this study. Their willingness to share difficult personal and professional experiences made this research possible.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the writing of this article.

Authors' Contributions

Roohallah Noori: Conception and design of the study; analysis and interpretation of data; drafting of the manuscript; supervision of the study. Mohammad Mesbah Mesbah: Acquisition of data. Yousef Vakili: Critical revision of the manuscript for important intellectual content; statistical analysis. Akbar Hasanpoor: Administrative, technical, and material support. All authors: Read and approved the final manuscript and agreed to be accountable for all aspects of the work.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest regarding the publication of this manuscript.

Negative AI Statement

The author(s) declare that no AI tools or services were used or heavily applied during the preparation of this work.

OPEN ACCESS

©2026 The author(s). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third-party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this license, visit: *http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/*

Refrences

Amnesty International. (1983). *Afghanistan: Reports of Torture*. Amnesty International.

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). (2007). *State-Building, security, and the rule of law in Afghanistan*. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit..

Barfield, T. (2010). *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Princeton University Press.

Bhaskar, R. (1975). *A Realist Theory of Science*. Leeds Books.

Bhaskar, R. (1998). *The Possibility of Naturalism* (3rd ed.). Routledge.

Capoccia, G., & Kelemen, R. D. (2007). The study of critical junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism. *World Politics, 59*(3), 341-369. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100020852

Denhardt, J. V., & Denhardt, R. B. (2015). *The New Public Service* (4th ed.). Routledge.

Denzin, N. K. (1978). The Research act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods. McGraw-Hill.

Dupree, L. (1980). *Afghanistan* (2nd ed.). Princeton University Press.

Edwards, D. B. (2002). *Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad*. University of California Press.

Ghani, A., & Lockhart, C. (2008). Fixing Failed States. A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World. Oxford.

Giustozzi, A. (2000). War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan, 1978-1992. Hurst.

Giustozzi, A. (2007). Koran, Kalashnikov, and laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan. Hurst.

Gregorian, V. (1969). *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*. Stanford University Press.

Human Rights Watch. (2022). *Afghanistan: Taliban Commit Massacres, Atrocities*. Human Rights Watch.

Lange, M. (2013). *Comparative-Historical Methods*. SAGE Publications.

Mahoney, J. (2000). Path Dependence In Historical Sociology. Theory and Society, 29(4), 507-548. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007113830879

Mahoney, J. (2004). Comparative-Historical Methodology. *Annual Review of Sociology, 30*, 81-101. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.30.012703.110507

Mill, J. S. (1843). *A System of Logic*. John W. Parker.

Nateghi, H., & Shah-Naqavi, D. S. A. S. (2022). Philosophy of Pilgrimage of the Holy Prophets and Infallible People and its Effect on Giving Meaning to Human life. *International Multidisciplinary Journal of Pure Life (IMJPL), 9*(30), 91–117. https://doi.org/10.22034/imjpl.2022.6795

Patton, M. Q. (2015). Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods (4th ed.). Sage.

Pierson, P. (2004). Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton University Press.

Rashid, A. (2000). Taliban: Militant Islam, oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. Yale University Press.

Riggs, F. W. (1964). Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society. Houghton Mifflin.

Roy, O. (1986). *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*. Cambridge University Press.

Roy, O. (1995). Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War. Darwin Press.

Rubin, B. R. (1995). The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System. Yale University Press.

Shahrani, M. N. (2002). War, factionalism, and the state in Afghanistan. American Anthropologist, 104(3), 715–722. https://doi.org/10.1525/aa.2002.104.3.715

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. (2021). *What We Need to Learn: Lessons From Twenty Years of Afghanistan Reconstruction*. U.S. Congress.

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. (2022). *Annual Report: Protection of Civilians in Afghanistan*. United Nations.

Van Evera, S. (1997). Guide to Methods For Students of Political Science. Cornell University Press.

Weber, M. (1978). *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology* (G. Roth & C. Wittich, Eds.). University of California Press.

World Bank. (2005). *Afghanistan: State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty*. World Bank.

AUTHOR BIOSKETCHES

Roohallah Noori. *Human Resource Management Department, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran.*
✓ Email: *rnoori@khu.ac.ir*
✓ ORCID: *https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2453-4683*

Akbar Hassanpoor. *Human Resource Management Department, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran.*
✓ Email: a.*hassanpoor@khu.ac.ir*
✓ ORCID: *https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6570-4162*

Yousef Vakili. *Human Resource Management Department, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran.*
✓ Email: y.*vakili@khu.ac.ir*
✓ ORCID: *https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3047-4760*

Mohammad Mesbah Mesbah. *Human Resource Management Department, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran.*
✓ Email: *mohammadmesbah@khu.ac.ir*
✓ ORCID: *https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3047-4760*

CITE THIS ARTICLE

Noori, R., Hassanpoor, A., Vakili, Y., & Mesbah, M. M. (2026). Indigenous Values for Pure Living in Afghan Society: A Comparative-Historical Study. *International Multidisciplinary Journal of Pure Life (IMJPL), 13*(45), 1-26.

DOI: ***https://doi.org/10.22034/imjpl.2026.12251***

URL: ***http://p-l.journals.miu.ac.ir/article_12251.html***